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The New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure: State Court Evasion
of the Burger Court
By DONALD E. WH sES, JR.*
In his own way, every U.S. president has tried to mold the
Supreme Court in his own political image. Washington stacked
the Court with dedicated Federalists, Lincoln appointed men
with strong pro-Union views and Franklin Roosevelt named New
Deal loyalists. No president in history has outdone Richard
Nixon. With four appointments in his first term alone, Nixon has
already delivered on his promise to blunt the judicial revolution
of the Warren Court. The new conservative majority has cut
back on the rights of criminal suspects, largely ignored the con-
stitutional demands of the poor and held firmly but narrowly
to the desegregation line that the Warren Court drew in 1954.
The Court has been transformed from a tribunal of unprecedented
legal daring to one of modest aims and self-limiting accomplish-
ments. It is no longer a bold, innovative institution and has
abandoned, for the moment at least, the role of keeper of the
nation's conscience. *
State courts may be on the verge of gaining new importance,
if, in anticipation of the Supreme Court's retrenchment, state
constitutions become a more important source of limitations on
state power. In fact, state constitutions may provide the only
outlet for judges and lawyers who disagree with the more defer-
ential approach the Supreme Court may take toward legislation
and other state action.* * *
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A.,
1965, J.D. 1969, University of Florida. The author expresses his appreciation to
Andrew M. Scherffus, a student at the University of Georgia School of Law, for his
assistance in the preparation of this article.
S* J. SioN, IN His OwN IMAGE, THE SumaErm CouRT iN RicmAmw NIoN's
AmMUaCA 288 (1973).




During the 1960's there was widespread disaffection with the
Supreme Court of the United States.1 Doubtlessly some of the
discontent was attributable to Warren Court decisions on legisla-
tive reapportionment2 and prayer' and Bible reading in the pub-
lic schools. But in retrospect it seems clear that decisions de-
fining the rights of criminal suspects caused the greatest amount
of public concern.5
Certainly the Supreme Court was innovative in the criminal
justice area. Between June 19, 1961, when the opinion in Mapp v.
Ohio6 was announced, and June 23, 1969, when Benton v. Mary-
land' was decided, this nation underwent a criminal procedure
revolution. The revolution was in two parts. First, through a
process of "selective incorporation,"8 provisions of the Bill of
Bights were held applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendmentY The "selective incorpora-
tion" cases interred the view that the constitutional rights of a
person charged with crime in a state court are violated only when
fundamentally unfair procedures are followed and firmly estab-
lished the proposition that federal constitutional rights are to be
enforced by the same standards in federal and state courts.
Second, liberal interpretations of the Bill of ights greatly ex-
panded the scope of federal constitutional protections. The right
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, the privilege
I Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court Mandates Dur-
ing the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U.L. REv. 260, n.2 (1972).
2 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
8 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).4 Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
5 For a good account of the public furor created by these decisions, see F.
GAnAm, TnE SELF-INFLircmD WouND (1970).
6867 U.S. 643 (1961).
7 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
8The "selective incorporation" doctrine was formulated by Justice Brennan.
Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961) (dissenting opinion of Brennan, J.); Ohio
ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 236 (1960) (opinion of Brennan, J.). For a good
analysis of the doctrine, see Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth
Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963); Rosen, Contemporary Winds and Cur-
rents in Criminal Law, with Special Reference to Constitutional Criminal Pro-
cedure, 27 Mn. L. REv. 103 (1967).
9 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Klopfer v. North Carolina,
886 U.S. 213 (1967); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 835 (1963); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel were con-
strued to "restrain police from some unlawful practices which
were previously regarded as routine."10
It is hardly news that the Supreme Court has changed since
the innovative Sixties. 1 In cases involving obscenity,12 juvenile
justice,13 loyalty oaths, 14 loss of nationality,15 preinduction review
of selective service board orders,'6 and federal injunctive 7 and
declaratory' relief against state criminal prosecutions, the Burger
Court has shown that its judicial philosophy is substantially dif-
ferent from that of the Warren Court. Nowhere is this change
more evident than in the field of criminal procedure. Since June
28, 1969, when Warren E. Burger became the fifteenth Chief
Justice, it has grown increasingly obvious that the Burger Court
intends to reverse the trend of the past decade and to constrict
rather than expand the rights of the accused. The Burger Court
has given the imprimatur of the Constitution to nonunanimous
jury verdicts in state criminal cases' 9 and to use immunity in
return for compelled incriminating testimony.20 Important de-
cisions of the Warren era extending the rights of the accused have
been eviscerated by narrow interpretations21 and by nonretro-
active application.22 In cases where an accused's rights were
10 Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MicH. L. REV. 249,
254 (1968).
" See J. SIMoN, IN His OwN IMAcE, THE SUPREmm COURT IN RicHA
NIXON's AmMUCA (1973).
12 Compare Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) with Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
13 Compare In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528 (1971).
14 Compare Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967) with Cole v. Richardson,
405 U.S. 676 (1972).
15 Compare Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) with Rogers v. Bellei, 401
U.S. 815 (1971).16 Compare Ostereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968) with Fein
v. Selective Service Sys., 405 U.S. 365 (1972).
17 Compare Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) with Younger v. Har-
ris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
I8 Compare Zwickler v. Koota, 387 U.S. 241 (1967) with Samuels v. Mackell,
401 U.S. 66 (1971).
19Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356 (1972).2 0 Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972);
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).21 E.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682 (1972).22 E.g., Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973); Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667 (1971); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
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plainly violated, convictions have nevertheless been upheld by
generous construction of the harmless error doctrine.23 Moreover,
concurring and dissenting opinions by Chief Justice Burger and
other recent appointees have indicated a desire to limit severely
or overrule completely some of the controversial Warren Court
decisions.24
Of course it would be an exaggeration to say that every deci-
sion of the Burger Court in the area of criminal procedure con-
stitutes a retreat from the Warren era. The soundness of the
"selective incorporation" cases seems unchallenged. 25 The Burger
Court has extended the right to counsel to all offenses resulting
in imprisonment, 2 breathed new life into the right to a speedy
trial,27 and declared unconstitutional warrantless electronic sur-
veillance in domestic national security cases.2s In 1972, with all
four Nixon appointees dissenting, the Burger Court took a step
the Warren Court had never dared to take when it invalidated the
death penalty, at least as presently imposed. -9 Nevertheless, the
consistency of views and voting records among the Nixon ap-
pointees,30 the age and health of the activist Warren Court hold-
overs,31 and the historical tendency of the Court to assume the
2 3 E.g., Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); Milton v. Wainwright, 407
U.S. 371 (1972).
24 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (concurring opinion of
Powell, J.); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (dissenting opinion of
Blackmun, J.); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (dissenting opinion of Burger, Cj.).
25 But see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
26Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
27 Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514 (1972); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
28 United States v. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
2
9 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
30 Analyzing the opinions written during the October 1971 term, Philip B.
Kurland concluded:
"The Chief Justice expressed the views of Justices Blackmun, Powell,
and Rehnquist in every one of his opinions. Burger reciprocated this ex-
pression of confidence in the opinions of Rehnquist and, while never in
dissent from the opinions of the other two members of his team, con-
curred specially with regard to Blackmun in 8 per cent of the latter's
opinions, and with reference to 17 per cent of Powells opinions. The
proximity of views of Blackmun and Rehnquist were of similar magni-
tude."
Kurland, 1971 Term: The Year of the Stewart-White Court, 1972 Sup. CT. REv.
181, 182-83. Kurland also discovered that Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehn-
uist voted together "in 70.6 per cent of the closely divided cases in which they
al sat." Id. at 185.
31 justice Douglas, now 75, wears a pacemaker. Justice Marshall is 65 and
has been in poor health. Justice Brennan is 67.
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stance of its Chief Justice,32 make it difficult to disagree with the
conclusion that "major expansions of procedural rights have been
slowed or halted entirely" and that "as the Burger Court solidifies
its sense of direction, that direction will, in all probability, run
counter to much of what occurred during the Warren era."33
The Court's shift in attitude has made conditions ripe for an
astonishing development in criminal procedure-evasion of the
Supreme Court by state courts willing to protect rights of criminal
defendants that are no longer guaranteed under the Federal Con-
stitution as interpreted by the Burger Court.
Several important studies of state court evasion of the Supreme
Court have been published over the past twenty years.34 This
article differs from them in two important respects. First, the
type of evasion studied in the past occurred under circumstances
where the federal rights of the accused were broader than his
state rights, and the state courts attempted to narrow those
rights. This article considers evasion which permits the accused
to assert rights under state law that he might not have under
federal law. Second, the means of evasion examined in earlier
studies consisted principally of disobedience to or avoidance of
mandates of the Supreme Court after cases had been reviewed
by the Court and remanded for further proceedings. The evasion
analyzed here involves no lawless defiance of the Court; rather,
it is accomplished by the expedient of exploiting loopholes in the
Court's power of review.
While the number of recent cases which are identifiable as
evasive is quite small, the evasion cases decided since 1969 are
nevertheless of tremendous importance; they are the harbingers
of a new era in criminal procedure. After a decade of Warren
Court activism in which federal rights assumed unheard of im-
portance in state criminal trials, the decisions of the Burger Court
indicate that henceforth the Constitution will assure only basic
32 Kurland, Enter the Burger Court: The Constitutional Business of the Su-
preme Court, O.T. 1969, 1970 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 1-2.
33 Stephens, The Burger Court: New Dimensions in Criminal Justice, 60 GEO.
L.J. 249, 277-78 (1971).34 E.g., Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court Man-
dates During the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U.L. REV. 260 (1972);
Note, Evasion of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remanded to State Courts
Since 1941, 67 HAuv. L. REv. 1251 (1954).
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standards of protection, and all rights above this minimum level
will exist, if at all, only by virtue of state law. Against the back-
ground of the Burger Court decisions, the evasion cases indicate
that the nation is moving into a new period of federalism in
criminal procedure in which the state-based rights of criminal
defendants will assume increasing significance as federal-based
rights play an ever-diminishing role.
Just how this shift can and to what extent it will occur re-
quires first an analysis of the Supreme Court's authority to review
state court decisions. This analysis is made in Part I. Thereafter,
Part II will examine the evasion of the Burger Court which has
occurred to date, and Part III will explore the possibilities for
future evasion.
I
Tim AUTHOITY OF THE SUPREME COURT To REviEw
STATE COURT DEcISIoNs
The Constitution does not explicitly empower the Supreme
Court to review state court decisions. It does provide that the
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction under such regu-
lations as Congress shall make. 5 Under the Judiciary Act of
1789, the Court was empowered to review state judgments,36 and
since that time the Court's authority to do so has not been open
to serious question.
Statutory authority for Supreme Court review of state court
decisions is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which restricts review
to state judgments involving federal questions. The statute
grants power to reexamine final judgments3 8 rendered by the
35 U.S. CONST. art. III.
36 Judiciary Act of 1789, oh. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85-87.
3 7 For an examination of the history of attacks on the Supreme Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction over state courts. see Warren, Legislative and Jud'cial Attacks
on the Supreme Court of the United States-a History of the Twenty-Fifth Sectionof the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. l~v. 1 (1918).
s88 The determination of whether the judgment is final is left to the Court
itself. The test is increasingly a pragmatic one with a trend toward relaxing the
finality requirement. Traditionally the rule has been that a judgment cannot be
considered final ff it leaves open something that may itself raise a federal question.
See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 483-85 (2d ed. 1970); Crick, The Final
Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932). In California v. Stewart,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), a state judgment ordering a retrial was held final under §
1257(3) since the state would have no appeal if the defendant were acquitted
at his retrial.
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highest court of a state in which a decision could be had in these
circumstances:
(1) By appeal, where the validity of a federal statute or
treaty is drawn in question, and the decision is against its
validity;
(2) By appeal, where the validity of a state statute is drawn
in question on the ground that it violates the Constitution,
treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in
favor of its validity; or
(3) By certiorari, where the validity of a federal statute or
treaty is drawn in question; where the validity of a state
statute is drawn in question on the ground it violates the Con-
stitution, treaties, or laws of the United States; or where any
title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under the Con-
stitution, treaties, or laws of the United States.
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1257 on its face authorizes review of
state judgments involving federal questions irrespective of the
presence of questions of state law, the Court has consistently
declined to review judgments of state courts resting on an ade-
quate state ground. Under the adequate state ground rule, the
Court will refuse to reexamine a state decision involving a federal
question if there is a nonfederal ground sufficient to support the
judgment.
The rule arose out of a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789
which limited Supreme Court review of state decisions to federal
questions.39 Even though this restriction was removed in 1867
when the Judiciary Act of 1789 was repealed,40 the Court in
Murdock v. City of Memphis41 adhered to the limitation:
The twenty-fifth section of the act of 1789 has been the
subject of innumerable decisions, some of which are to be
found in almost every volume of the reports from that year
down to the present. These form a system of appellate juris-
prudence relating to the exercise of the appellate power of this
39 But no other error shall be assigned or regarded ground for review in any
such case as aforesaid, than such appears on tle face of the record, and im-
mediately respects the before-mentioned questions of validity or construction of
the said constitution, treaties, statutes. comm'ssions, or authorities in dispute.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 86-87.
40 Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 886.
41 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
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court over the courts of the States. That system has been
based upon the fundamental principle that this jurisdiction
was limited to the correction of errors relating solely to Fed-
eral law. And though it may be argued with some plausibility
that the reason of this is to be found in the restrictive clause
of the act of 1789, which is omitted in the act of 1867, yet an
examination of the cases will show that it rested quite as much
on the conviction of this court that without that clause and on
general principles the jurisdiction extended no further. It re-
quires a very bold reach of thought, and a readiness to impute
to Congress a radical and hazardous change of policy vital in
its essential nature to the independence of the State courts,
to believe that that body contemplated, or intended, what is
claimed, by the mere omission of a clause in the substituted
statute, which may well be held to have been superfluous, or
nearly so, in the old one.42
Whether the adequate state ground rule is one of jurisdiction
or of judicial administration is unclear. Early cases indicated that
the rule was simply a self-imposed restriction. Accordingly, state
judgments resting on adequate state grounds were affirmed.43
Recent cases, however, take the position that the rule is juris-
dictional.44 The rationale appears to be that there is no case or
controversy when issues of state law are dispositive of the case,
even though the decision might also be based upon erroneously
decided questions of federal law. In Herb v. Pitcairn45 the Court
said:
The reason [for the rule] is so obvious that it has rarely
been thought to warrant a statement. It is found in the
partitioning of the power between the state and federal ju-
dicial systems and in the limitation of our own jurisdiction.
Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to the
extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our
power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions.
We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the
same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we
421d. at 630.
43 E.g., Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).44 E.g., Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965); Janko-
vich v. Indiana Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller,
296 U.S. 207 (1935).
45 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
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corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount
to nothing more than an advisory opinion.
46
The tests for "adequacy" have been developed primarily in
response to state court attempts to frustrate claims of federal
rights. In most cases the state ground evaluated has been a rule
of procedure that allowed the state court to refuse to decide a
federal claim because it had been improperly raised.47 In this con-
text, whether a state procedural ground is adequate is itself a
federal question, 48 and the adequacy of the state ground must be
evaluated in terms of whether the state rule justified a refusal to
consider the federal claim raised in the state court.
For determining whether a state ground is adequate, the
Supreme Court has fashioned several standards to aid in inter-
preting state decisions. The Court has said that the nonfederal
ground must be broad enough, without reference to the federal
question, to sustain the judgment below.4 9 A second standard
states that "where a non-federal ground is so interwoven with the
other [i.e., federal ground] as not to be an independent matter
...our jurisdiction is plain." 0 In other words, the nonfederal
ground must be independent of the federal question. In Ivanhoe
Irrigation District v. McCracken,51 the state ground was held
inadequate to preclude Supreme Court review because it was
based upon an interpretation of a federal statute. A third standard
requires simply that the nonfederal ground be tenable. 2 A state
ground is untenable if it is "without any fair or substantial sup-
46 Id. at 125-26.47 E.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 577 (1969). Douglas v. Alabama, 380U.S. 415 (1965); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); Wright v. Georgia,
373 U.S. 284 (1963); Staub v. City of Baxley, 313 U.S. 313 (1958); Reece v.
Georgia, 350 U.S. 853 (1955); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900).48 5Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 44, 447 ( 965); Love v. Grith, 266 U.S.
32, 33-34 (1924).
4 Eustis v. Bo les, 150 U.S. 3 70 (1893); Murdock v. City of Memphis,87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590. 636 (1875).oSEnterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers' Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164
1357 U.S. 275 ,( 1958).
5. One writer has isolated three considerations to assist in determining
whether a state ground is tenable: (1) whether a consistent pattern of state court
decisions can be found relative to the state ground at issue; (2) whether the
nonfederal ground is consistent with generally accepted principles of law; (3)whether in the state court there was adequate forewarning of procedural require-
ments. Note, The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in the Supreme Court, 74 H-Iv.
L. nEv. 1375, 1382 (1961).
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port."53 In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 4 a local pro-
cedural rule was held not to constitute an adequate state ground
because the petitioner was not deemed to have been fairly ap-
prised of its existence. In Leathe v. Thomas55 the Court noted
that a state ground would not be adequate where it was so
palpably unfounded that it could not be presumed to have been
entertained.
These three criteria-breadth, independence, and tenability-
are obviously interrelated. They are also separable. For example,
breadth and independence have been distinguished on the theory
that a sufficiently broad state ground determines the rights of the
parties, whereas independence refers to the reasoning underlying
the state ground.56 Tenability has particular reference to whether
the state ground is fair and reasonable.57
In overview, it is clear that in a state case where no federal
claim is raised by the parties the Supreme Court has no authority
under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to review the judgment because no federal
question is involved. If a federal claim is raised coincident with
issues of state law, the adequate state grounds doctrine must be
considered if the decision rests in whole or in part on state law.
(If the state court rests its decision solely on federal grounds,
then Supreme Court jurisdiction to review the case is clear under
28 U.S.C. § 1257). A state judgment resting solely on state law
may nevertheless be reviewable if a claimed federal right was
unjustifiably denied. A state judgment resting partly on state
law and partly on federal law is likewise reviewable if the federal
issue is wrongly decided and the state ground is not independently
adequate to support the judgment.
Important corollaries follow this brief synopsis. First, if a
state court were to grant an accused a right based solely on state
law that is broader than any right guaranteed under federal law,
53 Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 22 (1920).
54 57 U.S. 449 (1958).
55 207 U.S. 93, 99 (1907).56 Note, The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in the Supreme Court, 74 HAv.
L. REv. 1375, 1382 (1961).
57 See, e.g., Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537, 543
(1930) (interpretation of state statute by state court did not "so depart from
established principles as to be without substantial basis"); Cent. Union Tel. Co. v.
City of Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 195 (1925) (state construction of state
statute binding on Court "unless so unfair or unreasonable in its application to
those asserting a federal right as to obstruct it").
[Vol. 62.
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the case cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. This is so
regardless of whether the accused claimed the right on the basis
of federal law. Even though a right may be claimed under federal
law, granting the claim on the basis of state law could not work
a denial of the federal right, and the state ground would not raise
a separate federal question of "adequacy". Second, if the state
court granted the right on the basis of both state and federal law,
even a mistaken interpretation of federal law would not effect
the otherwise independent and adequate state ground supporting
the decision.
Supreme Court review of state court judgments is therefore
far from unlimited. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 precludes review of state
judgments resting solely on state grounds, and a judgment does
not involve a federal question simply because a state court
establishes rights under state law that are more favorable to the
accused than his rights under federal law. The adequate state
ground rule bars reexamination of judgments resting on adequate
state grounds, and while the rule was formulated to prevent cir-
cumvention of claimed federal rights, it presently encompasses
situations in which a state-based right is broader than a federally
based right. As shall be seen, these important limitations on
Supreme Court review play a vital role in formulating a strategy
for evading the Burger Court.
II
STATE CoURT EvAsION OF THE BURGER CouRT
A. Background
Prior to 1914 the Supreme Court could review a state court
judgment only when the state court had upheld the validity of a
state statute, struck down a federal statute or treaty, or denied a
claim of federal right or privilege. As a result the Supreme Court
could not review state judgments sustaining federal claims. This
restriction on the Court's power of review originated in the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789,58 and the reason for the limitation has been
explained as follows:
58 And be it further enacted, That a final judgment or decree in any suit,
in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the
suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty
or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the
decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the
(Continued on next page)
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The jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court by the
Judiciary Act was wide enough to restrain local jealousies and
to preserve the newly created central authority from encroach-
ment by the states. No more was necessary. If a state court in
that day and generation sustained a federal right, it would be
practically certain to prevail in the Supreme Court also. The
denial of an appeal in such cases was a wise measure to pre-
vent fruitless litigation.59
However, in response to state court decisions that struck down
humanitarian legislation as violative of the Federal Constitution,
a statute was passed in 1914 which vested the Supreme Court
with authority to review state decisions upholding claims of
federal rights. 0 The immediate impetus for enacting the statute
was an unpopular New York decision invalidating a workman's
compensation act on the ground that it was repugnant to both
the federal and state constitutions. 61
The first state judgment in a criminal case that was set aside
for overextending the rights of an accused was California V.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the
ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States, and the decision is in favour of such their validity, or
where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the con-
stitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the
United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or
exemptions specially set up or claimed by either party, under such clause
of the said Constitution, treaty, statute, or commission, may be re-
examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United
States...
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 25, 1 Stat. 85-86.
59 Note, Wider Jurisdiction for the United States Supreme Court, 28 H Rv. L.
REv. 408 (1915).
60 It shall be competent for the Supreme Court to require, by certiorari
or otherwise..., although the decision in such case may have been in favor
of the validity of the treaty or statute or authority exercised under the
United States or may have been against the validity of the State statute
or authority claimed to be repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or
laws of the United States, or in favor of the title, right, privilege, or
immunity claimed under the Constitution, treaty, statute, commission, or
authority of the United States.
Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790.
Decisions on the law prior to 1914 are collected at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257 n.1
(1966). The cases illustrate the requirement that the state judgment be adverse
to a federal claim before Supreme Court jurisdiction can be invoked.
61 Ives v. South Buffalo Bly. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911). It has
been noted that the decision would not have been reviewable even after passage
of the 1914 act because of the adequate state ground rule. See C. wMscur, LAw
or FEDERAL Counrs 482 (2d ed. 1970).
For an influential article which helped bring about passage of the 1914
statute, see Dodd, The United States Supreme Court as the Final Interpreter of the
Federal Constitution, 6 IlL.. L. REv. 289 (1911).
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Green, 2 decided precisely one year after Chief Justice Burger
took office. In Green, the California Supreme Court had held that
a statutory provision permitting use of prior inconsistent state-
ments as substantive evidence violated the confrontation clause
of the sixth amendment.63 On certiorari, the judgment was va-
cated by the Burger Court, which held that substantive use of
such statements was not forbidden by the Constitution where
the declarant is testifying as a witness and is subject to full cross-
examination.
The California Supreme Court was again held to have ad-
judged an accused's rights too generously in California v. Byers.64
The defendant had been charged with violating a criminal statute
which required drivers of automobiles involved in an accident
to stop and furnish information. The California Supreme Court
granted a writ of prohibition to restrain the preceedings on the
grounds that the statute infringed upon the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment.65 The
Burger Court, on certiorari, vacated and remanded, holding that
the statute did not violate respondents rights under the fifth
amendment.
More recently, in Michigan v. Payne,6 the Court reversed the
Michigan Supreme Court and held that North Carolina v. Pearce67
was not to be given retroactive application.68
The importance of these decisions can scarcely be overesti-
mated. They present the anomalous spectacle of the highest
federal court taking a dimmer view of federal rights than state
courts, and they show that the Burger Court will not hesitate to
set aside state judgments that expand federal rights beyond the
62 399 U.S. 149 (1970).63 People v. Green, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
64 402 U.S. 424 (1971).65 Byers v. Justice Court, 458 P.2d 465, 80 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1969).
61 412 U.S. 47 (1973).
67895 U.S. 711 (1969). In Pearce it was held that the double jeopardy
clause made applicable to the states by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)
prohibited the imposition after retrial of a more severe sentence unless the record
affirmatively showed objective information concerning behavior by the defendant
after the original sentencing which would justify the harsher sentence.
68 In Michigan v. Bloss, 413 U.S. 909 (1973), the Burger Court vacated the
judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) and the Court's
other decisions of June 25, 1978 revivifying criminal obscenity statutes. The
Michigan court had reversed respondent's conviction for violating a state ob-
scenity statute on the ground that the allegedly obscene materials were protected
by the first amendment. See People v. Bloss, 201 N.W.2d 806 (Mich. 1972).
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limits thought desirable by the Burger Court. If rights broader
than the Burger Court definitions are to be given to criminal
defendants, then more liberally oriented state courts must act
evasively.
B. The Strategy of Evasion
A state court anxious to evade the Supreme Court will have
to be concerned with the Court's certiorari jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1257(3).69 Therefore a state court must first determine
whether its judgment, if not evasive, will be subject to review
under the provisions of § 1257(3). If the judgment is reviewable,
then an evasive state court must frame the judgment in such a
way that § 1257(3) is avoided.
There are several possible techniques for avoiding Supreme
Court jurisdiction under § 1257(3). A state court might take
advantage of the constitutional limitation of Supreme Court juris-
diction to cases or controversies and attempt evasion through
non-reviewable advisory opinions construing a federal right more
broadly than the Supreme Court, if such opinions are authorized
under state law. For a simple reason, however, this technique is
not a practicable method of evasion. Even though the advisory
opinion itself might not be subject to review, subsequent applica-
tions of the opinion to cases or controversies would be reviewable.
Alternatively, a state court might refuse to inject a federal
question into a case in which issues of state law alone had been
raised, since neither constitutional nor statutory provisions per-
mit the Supreme Court to review decisions not involving a federal
question. Thus, in a case in which no federal claim is raised, a
state court may avoid review by deliberately declining to reach a
federal question sua sponte and instead holding that rights under
state law are at least as comprehensive as those under federal
law. This technique is limited, however, to cases in which a
69 It seems doubtful that the Supreme Court would narrow the rights of the
accused in a case on appeal under § 1257(1) because this subsection requires that
the judgment be against the validity of a federal treaty or statute, and such a
judgment would not be in favor of the rights of an accused except in the unlikely
event that the treaty or statute invalidated confers broader rights than the
Constitution. It is even more doubtful that a judgment appealed under § 1257(2)
would be set aside for having given too broad an interpretation to a federal right.
§ 1257(2) requires that a state statute be held not repugnant to the Constitution.
To be invalid, a statute would have to abridge a federal right.
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federal claim has not been raised (an unlikely occurrence, since
defendants tend to raise every claim possible), and courts have
no control over which claims are raised by an accused.
As the analysis in Part I suggests,70 a far more promising
method of evasion exists. It consists of using the adequate state
grounds doctrine and is accomplished by grounding a decision on
a construction of the accused's rights under state law which is at
least as favorable as the rights given by federal law. Under the
tests for "adequacy" previously noted-breadth, independence
and tenability-such an approach would clearly serve to insulate
the decision from Supreme Court review. Furthermore, this
approach avoids the problems encountered under the advisory
opinion technique, and it places state courts in control of the
critical issues decided in any given case.
State courts have precluded review by the method of holding
in favor of an accused's rights on the basis of state law before the
advent of the Burger Court.7 And on numerous occasions state
courts have iterated that they may grant broader rights under
state law than the Supreme Court may be willing to grant under
federal law.7 2 Nevertheless, it is only since the advent of the
Burger Court that state courts have made systematic use of the
adequate state ground rule for evasion purposes.
70 See text at notes 57-58 supra.
71 For example, in People v. Barber, 46 N.E.2d 329 (1943), a Jehovah's
Witness had been convicted of violating a town licensing ordinance after he
had offered religious books for sale. The year before, in Jones v. Opelika, 316
U.S. 584 (1942) the Supreme Court had held that a similar Alabama city
ordinance which had been interpreted by the Alabama state courts to apply to
the sale of religious books by Jehovah's Witnesses was not inconsistent with the
Constitution. The court in Barber, after gratuitiously pointing out "that in
determining the scope and effect of the guarantees of fundamental rights of the
individual in the Constitution of the State of New York, this court is bound to
exercise its independent judgment and is not bound by a decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States limiting the scope of similar guarantees in the Con-
stitution of the United States, Barber at 831, reversed the conviction by holding
that the ordinance could not be construed to cover solicitation by members of
religious societies for the purpose of paying the costs of the religious body's
solicitations or of raising funds to support the society.
Indeed, some state courts have even gone beyond the Warren Courts hold-
ings. See State v. Browder, 486 P.2d 925 (Alaska 1971); Baker v. City of Fairbanks,
471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970); Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969); State
v. Brown, 497 P.2d 1191 (Ore. 1972).72 E.g., Lanied v. State, 486 P.2d 981 (Alaska 1971) State ex rel. Juhan v. Dis-
trict Court, 489 P.2d 741 (Co9. 1968); Curry v. Supreme Court, 470 P.2d 345, 87
Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970); State ex rel. Juhan v. District Court, 439 P.2d 741 (Co.
1968); Creamer v. State, 192 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 1972); State v. Eexeira, 433 P.2d
593 (Hawaii 1967); State v. Chandler, 236 A.2d 632 (N.J. 1967).
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C. The Pattern of Evasion of the Burger Court
By no means all or even a majority of state high courts disagree
with the Burger Court's approach toward the rights of criminal
suspects. Many state courts decried decisions of the Warren
Court,7" and it seems reasonable to believe that these courts are
not dissatisfied with what the Burger Court is doing. But a few
state courts, especially those in California and Hawaii, seem de-
termined to evade the Burger Court's retrenchment. Moreover,
these courts seem to be fully aware of the use of the adequate
state ground as the proper strategy of evasion. Although only a
handful of evasive decisions have been located, they show clearly
that some state courts, anxious to protect the rights of the accused
and yet avoid review by the Burger Court, have used the rule to
preclude the possibility of such review.
Not every decision vindicating an accused's rights under
federal and state law or under state law alone is evasive. Although
a number of decisions have been handed down over the past few
years upholding claims of state or of federal and state rights, it
cannot be said that they were all evasive. 74 For purposes of this
article, an evasive case is one in which it is apparent from the
opinion or the circumstances under which it was delivered that
the state court intended to use the adequate state ground rule to
avoid Supreme Court review. The evasion cases may be grouped
into categories: cases in which the evasion was acomplished by
resting the decision on nonfederal grounds alone, and cases in
which the evasion was accomplished by resting the decision on
both federal and nonfederal grounds. In all but one of the cases
the state ground was founded on a state constitution; in the one
case, the state ground was statutory.
73 For example, in Leonard v. State, 453 P.2d 257, 259 (Okla. Cr. App. 1969),
the court bitterly assailed the Warren Court decision in Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969), which established stringent probable cause requirements
for search warrants. The court said that the decision in Spinelli was "rendered
by a divided court whose dissenting minority speaks with greater clarity and
logic, based on experience, than does the technical gymnastics of the majority.
•. . we must forge yet another link in the federal handcuffs placed upon state
courts and law enforcement officials." See also State v. Lettle Art. Co., 204 N.W.2d
574 (Neb. 1973).
74 E.g., Glasgow v. State, 469 P.2d 682 (Alaska 1970); In re Lynch, 503 P.2d
921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972); People v. McCabe, 275 N.E.2d 407 (IMI. 1971);
People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. 1972); State v. Matteson, 205
N.W.2d 512 (S.D. 1972).
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1. STATE GROUNDS ALONE
The defendant in People v. Anderson75 claimed that capital
punishment violated both the federal and the state constitutions.
The California Supreme Court held in favor of the defendant
with respect to the issue of state law and found it unnecessary
to resolve the federal question. The wording and circumstances
of the decision make plain that it was evasive. Anderson was
decided at a time when, as the California court knew,76 several
cases raising the identical federal question were pending in the
Supreme Court.77 There can be little doubt that the decision in
Anderson was handed down to protect the rights of those sen-
tenced to death in California in the event that the Burger Court
should uphold the death penalty.
78
The California attorney general certainly believed the decision
was evasive. After his petition for rehearing was denied, he filed
a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Invoking the juris-
diction of the Court under § 1257(8), 79 he asserted that the Cali-
fornia court had acted "with the obvious purpose of avoiding
that court's recent experience with the Court's review of Cali-
fornia constitutional provisions and statutes on federal constitu-
tional grounds"80 and then cited Green and Byers. Asking the
Court to "disregard the California Supreme Court's effort to dis-
guise its decision for the purpose of avoiding this Court's review,"
he claimed:
The question squarely presented by the Petition is whether
the highest court of a State may defeat the jurisdiction of this
Court to review vital federal constitutional issues by pur-
porting to decide the issue on the basis of an identical pro-
vision in the state constitution. 8'
75 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
76Id. at 883 n.1, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155 n.1 (1972).
77 The cases were: Aikens v. California, cert. granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971);
Furman v. Georgia, cert. granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971); Jackson v. Georgia, cert.
granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971); Branch v. Texas, cert. granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971).78 The court noted that it faced "a question which cannot be avoided by
deferring to any other court or to any other branch of government." 493 P.2d at
887, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 159 (1972) (emphasis added). Other commentators have con-
cluded that Anderson was evasive. See Barrett, Anderson and the Judicial Func-
tion, 45 So. CAL. L. REv. 739 (1972); Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State
Ground, 45 So. CAL. L. REv. 750 (1972).
7) Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3, California v. Anderson, 406 U.S. 958
(1972).
80 id. at 11.
81 Id. at 11.
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The petition was denied.82
In Anderson the state court was attempting to deal with the
possibility that the Burger Court might in several pending cases
rule against the accused with respect to the same federal question
raised in the state court. In the other four cases in which evasion
was attempted, the state court was concerned with the possibility
of avoiding a past decision of the Burger Court.
In State v. Santiago, 3 the defendant claimed that statements
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona8 4 had been used at
his trial. The prosecution contended that the statements were
properly introduced for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's
credibility. In Harris v. New York,85 decided ten months earlier,
the Burger Court had held that statements inadmissible under
Miranda as part of the prosecution's case in chief might never-
theless be admitted for impeachment purposes. Acknowledging
that it must yield to Supreme Court interpretations of the Federal
Constitution, the Hawaii Supreme Court took up the question
whether use of the statements, although permitted by the Federal
Constitution, was impermissible under the state constitutional
provision barring self-incrimination:
[T]his court is the final arbiter of the meaning of the pro-
visions of the Hawaii Constitution. Nothing prevents our con-
stitutional drafters from fashioning greater protections for
criminal defendants than those given by the United States
Constitution. [Citation omitted.] 0
The court then held that the Miranda rules were required by the
state constitution and that the state constitution made statements
inadmissible under the Miranda rules inadmissible for any pur-
pose, including impeachment.
8 7
At issue in State v. Collins 8 was the extent of the prosecution's
burden of establishing the admissibility of a confession alleged
82 California v. Anderson, 406 U.S. 958 (1972). Thereafter the Court dis-
missed the writ of certiorari in Aikens because petitioner no longer faced a realistic
prsect of execution due to Anderson. In its order the Court noted that Anderson
rse "on an adequate state ground." Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813, 814
(1972).
83 492 P.2d 657 (Hawaii 1971).
84 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
85 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
86492 P.2d 657, 664 (Hawaii 1971).
87 Id. at 664-65.
88 297 A.2d 620 (Me. 1972).
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to have been obtained illegally. In Lego v. Twomey, 9 the Burger
Court, less than a year before, had decided that the Constitution
requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The Maine
Supreme Judicial Court, basing its decision on public policy and
the privilege against self-incrimination, held that confessions
alleged to be inadmissible could not be admitted in a Maine state
court unless their admissibility was established beyond a reason-
able doubt.90
In State v. Granberry,91 the Missouri Supreme Court faced the
question which the Burger Court faced in Green: may prior in-
consistent statements made by a witness be used as substantive
evidence in a criminal case? In Green, the Burger Court had
found no federal constitutional impediment to such a practice.
The Missouri Court found the practice to be impermissible, ap-
parently on the ground that the Missouri Constitution permitted
the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements only when
made in the form of sworn, written depositions.92
In State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court of Rock County,93 the
defendant contended that recordings of conversations to which
he had been a party were inadmissible under the fourth amend-
ment. The conversations had been surreptitiously monitored and
recorded by a police officer without defendant's knowledge and
without court approval but with the consent of the other party
to the conversation. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that
under United States v. White,94 decided by the Burger Court two
months previously, no violation of the fourth amendment had
occurred. Nevertheless, the court held that although the de-
fendant's "expectation of privacy may not have [had] a constitu-
tional basis under White," 5 the evidence was inadmissible under
the Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law, at least as
89 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
0 v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 627 (Me. 1972). The conviction was never-
theless affirmed because the court found that the admissibility of the confessions
was established beyond a reasonable doubt.
91491 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1973).
921Id. at 531. The court held that depositions were admissible as substantive
evidence under case law, Pulitzer v. Chapman, 85 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1935) and
under a 1945 amendment to the state constitution, Mo. CoNsT. art. 1 § 18(b).
Otherwise prior inconsistent statements were inadmissible.
93 187 N.W.2d 354 (Wis. 1971).
94401 U.S. 745 (1971).




part of the prosecution's case in chief." Thus the court held that
a state statute provided a suspect with a right that was denied
him under the Federal Constitution as construed by the Burger
Court.1
7
2. FEDERL AN NoNFAERAL GROUNDs
In State v. Barquet, 8 the defendants claimed that two criminal
abortion statutes violated the fourteenth amendment because
they were vague and invaded the female's right to privacy. With
respect to the vagueness issue, the Florida Supreme Court noted
that it was "well aware of the pendency of various appeals before
the United States Supreme Court concerning the identical ques-
tion." Yet the court stated that "[a]lthough similar statutes may
be held valid by the United States Supreme Court, it does not
necessarily follow that they are valid under the state constitu-
tion."99 The court then held that the statutes violated both the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the similar
provision in the state constitution.' 0 Apparently recognizing that
its actions would insulate the decision from review, the court said
that "[tihe outcome on the appeals presently pending before the
United States Supreme Court will not affect our decision in this
case that the statutes are violative of our State Constitution."' 0 '
People v. Barksdale10 2 is a similar case. There, less than two
months before the landmark opinions in Roe v. Wade10 3 and Doe
v. Bolton,10 4 the California Supreme Court, on grounds of vague-
ness, held various provisions of the California Therapeutic Abor-
96 Id. at 357-59.
97 The court believed that the law's carefully drawn provisions regarding
prior court approval of electronic surveillance would be defeated if evidence ob-
tained without court approval and on the basis of consent of only one party to a
conversation were to become admissible. The court therefore reasoned that the
statute declaring interception with the consent of one party "not unlawful,"
W.S.A. § 968.31(2)(b) permitted such evidence to be used for investigative
purposes but not as evidence in court as part of the prosecution s case in chief.
Apparently the court left open the possibility that evidence so obtained could be
used to impeach the credibility of the defendant. See id. at 363 (dissenting
opinion of Hauser, J.).
98 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972).
99 Id. at 435. Presumably the cases pending in the Supreme Court to which
the court was referring were Roe v. Wade, prob. juris. postponed, 402 U.S. 941
(1971) and Doe v. Bolton, prob. juris. postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971).
100 Id. at 438.
101 Id. at 436.
102 503 P.2d 257, 105 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).
193 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
104 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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tion Act violative of the due process clauses of both the federal
and state constitutions.
In People v. Krivda,0 5 the California court held illegal a war-
rantless search of defendant's trash receptacle, citing an earlier
case'01 holding a search illegal under both the fourth amendment
and the state constitutional provision dealing with unreasonable
search and seizure. The state attorney general then filed a
petition for certiorari under § 1257(8). After oral argument, the
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case
to the court below, stating that it could not determine whether
the judgment rested on the fourth amendment, the equivalent
state constitutional provision, or both, and therefore was "unable
to say with any degree of certainty that the judgment of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court was not based on an adequate and inde-
pendent nonfederal ground." °7
On remand, the California court entered a second opinion:
Pursuant to the mandate . . . we have reexamined our
opinion in the subject case ... and certify that we relied upon
both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 19, of the California Constitution, and
that accordingly the latter provision furnished an independent
ground to support the result we reached in that opinion. Inas-
much as we deem it unnecessary to alter or amend our prior
decision, we reiterate that decision in its entirety.'08
The state promptly filed a second petition for certiorari under
the provisions of § 1257(8). Arguing that the Supreme Court was
not bound by the California Supreme Court's observation that
the California Constitution furnished an independent ground for
its opinion, the state attorney general asked the Court to estab-
lish new standards prohibiting state courts from utilizing the
adequate state ground rule to insulate from review decisions in
favor of the rights of criminal suspects:
The importance of this question of Supreme Court juris-
diction should be readily apparent to the members of this
Court. It involves the extent to which a State supreme court
105 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971).
100 People v. Edwards, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
'07 California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33, 35 (1972).
108 People v. Krivda, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973).
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can insulate its decision of a federal question from review by
this Court. State substantive law has received comparatively
little attention in the development of this Court's tests of
adequacy because it usually will not serve the purpose of dis-
criminating against the enforcement of federal rights . . .
Since the presence of an adequate state law ground will im-
munize a State supreme court's decision of a federal question
from review by this Court, it is important that this Court
fashion a test which delineates what is adequate in the sub-
stantive law context.109
The petition was denied." 0
The defendant's conviction for oral copulation was reversed
in People v. Triggs"l ' because the policeman's clandestine rest
room observation was held to violate the defendant's reasonable
expectation of privacy. In a telling footnote, the court showed
that it was cognizant of the fact that a decision vindicating a
defendant's rights under state law is immune from Supreme Court
review:
Most search and seizure cases decided by California courts
refer both to federal law and to state law. Since many of the
cases cited as setting forth "state law" make express reference
only to the Fourth Amendment, and neglect mention of the
parallel provisions of the California Constitution (art. I, § 19),
it is often difficult to determine whether a case was disposed
of on the basis of state or federal constitutional law. The issue
is, of course, crucial to federal review of our decisions."12
Then, after noting that it retained power to impose higher
standards on search and seizure than is required under federal
law, the court made plain that its decision was based on a vindica-
tion of both federal and state rights:
Although for the sake of convenience we often refer to
constitutional guarantees, both state and federal, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures under the rubric of 'Fourth
Amendment' rights, our decision today is based both upon
109 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7, 10-11, California v. Krivda, 412 U.S.
919 (1973).
110 California v. Krivda, 412 U.S. 919 (1973).
"1 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
3,12 Id. at 237 n.5, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, n.5 (1973).
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our reading of applicable federal Fourth Amendment law and
our own determination of the proper construction of article I,
section 19, of the California Constitution.11 3
D. Response of the Burger Court
The Burger Court's refusal to grant certiorari in Anderson and
Krivda indicates that the Court is not prepared at this time to
modify its interpretation of the adequate state ground rule, even
when the rule is clearly being used to evade the Court's appellate
jurisdiction. In two other cases the Court has manifested a lack
of inclination to modify the adequate state ground rule.
In Kaplan v. Superior Court,114 the California Supreme Court
held that a statutory provision115 had not repealed California's
so-called "vicarious exclusionary rule," by which a defendant is
permitted to invoke the exclusionary rule even though the im-
mediate victim of the illegal search and seizure is a third person
and the defendant is aggrieved by the search and seizure only
in the sense that evidence obtained thereby is to be used against
him."0 The rule was reaffirmed on the ground that it was based
on the constitutional principles of Mapp and People v. Cahan1 7
and was, therefore, exempt from the operation of the statute. The
decision was then appealed to the Supreme Court under § 1257(2)
on the theory that the state court had found a state statute not to
be repugnant to the Constitution. The state attorney general con-
tended that the supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution was
violated when the California court upheld a rule of standing
broader than the one applicable under the fourth amendment. 8
The appeal was dismissed because the judgment rested on an
adequate state ground." 9
In Commonwealth v. Ware,120 the Pennsylvania Supreme
113 Id.
114 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
115 CAL. Evm. CODE § 351.
116 As noted in Kaplan, the "vicarious exclusionary rule" is not, strictly speak-
ing an exclusionary rule but a rule of standing. 491 P.2d 1, 7 n.8, 98 Cal. Rptr.
649, 655 n.8 (1971). The rule originated in People v. Martin, 290 P.2d 855
(Cal. 1955).
"7 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955). In Cahan the court held that evidence obtained
illegally would be inadmissible in California state courts.
118 Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 4, California v. Kaplan, 407 U.S. 917
(1972).
119 California v. Kaplan, 407 U.S. 917 (1972).
120 284 A.2d 700 (Pa. 1971).
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Court, following Johnson v. New Jersey,'2' held that the Miranda
standards applied to a confession obtained prior to June 13, 1966,
the date Miranda was decided, where the trial had taken place
after June 13, 1966. While the Pennsylvania court stated that in
so holding it was "faithfully honor [ing] the United States Supreme
Court's clear directive" in Johnson, the court also stated that it
was applying Miranda to all trials beginning after June 13, 1966
as a matter of state law."22 Thereafter a petition for certiorari
was filed under § 1257(3) asking the Burger Court to overrule
Johnson and to hold that Miranda did not apply to confessions
taken before that date. The petition was granted. 23 The Court
then requested that the prosecution reply to the contention that
the decision below rested on an adequate state ground, and it
was argued that the state ground was not independent because
it was "so interwoven with the federal constitutional ground that
this Court is entitled to retain jurisdiction."24 On that issue, the
Supreme Court vacated its prior order and denied certiorari be-
cause the judgment rested on an adequate state ground. 25
Inl
THE PROSPECTS FOR CoNTmmNED EVASION
The use of the adequate state grounds doctrine to evade
Supreme Court review has not gone uncriticized. One writer
has suggested that the effect of an evasive judgment based on
both federal and state grounds will be to illegitimately insulate
the judgment not only from the Supreme Court but also from
"effective political review" because it will "increase the state
court's decision-making power vis-a-vis other branches of state
government." 2 ( He argues:
Decisions based on independent state and federal grounds
may substantially discourage any effort to use the state politi-
cal process to change the relevant state law, because amend-
ment to the state consitution or laws cannot correct the federal
121 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
122284 A.2d 700, at 702 (Pa. 1971).
123Pennsylvania v. Ware, 405 U.S. 987 (1972).
124 Brief for Petitioner at 14, Pennsylvania v. Ware, 405 U.S. 987 (1972).
125 Pennsylvania v. Ware, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).126 Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 So. CAL. L. BEv. 750,
757 (1972).
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defect and therefore cannot change the result of the state
court's decision. Of course, the citizens or the legislature may
proceed with an amendment to the state laws with the notion
that another court test involving only the federal question
can be instituted once the state law is changed. But it would
seem to require a very high degree of organization and com-
mitment to achieve political reform in such circumstances;
rather than changing the effect of the state court decision, all
reform of state law will accomplish is a "clear deck" upon
which a new law suit may be brought. The presence of the
federal ground will therefore produce an insulation from the
political process beyond that which a state court would other-
wise enjoy when it interprets the provision of state law in a
fashion unsatisfactory to a substantial portion of the state's
citizens. Thus the present operation of the adequate state
ground doctrine allows a state court, which may not be mo-
tivated by any considerations of efficiency, to insulate its de-
cision from effective review by either the judicial or political
processes for what may be a significant period.127
Perhaps this fear is misplaced. If a state court decision is
based on federal and state law, changes in the state constitution
or statutes can overturn the state law aspects of the decision, and
subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court can undermine the
questions of federal law. Anderson is illustrative. On February
18, 1972 the California Supreme Court struck down the death
penalty in California as violative of the state constitution. Shortly
thereafter a campaign to overturn the decision began. On June
29, 1972 the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Furman.
After June 29, 1972, therefore, it was clear that both the federal
and state constitutions prohibited capital punishment in Cali-
fornia. Nevertheless, on November 7, 1972, the electorate of the
state of California overwhelmingly overturned Anderson by
amendment28 to the state constitution. California voters were
not deterred from overturning a state decision even though a
decision of the Supreme Court bolstered Anderson.
127 Id.
128 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (1972). Following the adoption of the amend-
ment, the California Supreme Court, on the basis of the ex post facto law pro-
visions of both the Constitution and the state constitution, as well as Furman, held
that the death penalty could not be inflicted in cases arising before the effective
date of the amendment. See People v. Murphy, 502 P.2d 594, 596 n.2, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 138, 140 n.2 (1973).
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There may be reason to believe that evasive actions by state
courts will deprive the Supreme Court of opportunities to
decide important questions concerning the extent of the federal
rights of the accused. There can be no doubt that at least one of
the evasive cases deprived the Supreme Court of the chance to
decide an important constitutional question. In Krivda a full
scale attack on the exclusionary rule has been launched, and when
the Court vacated the judgment and then denied certiorari, it
lost the chance to overrule Mapp.129 And in Ware the adequate
state ground rule kept the Court from reconsidering the validity
of Miranda.180 Yet it would be unrealistic to think that evasive
cases would materially limit the Court's opportunities to decide
important questions of federal law. For one thing, the number
of state courts acting evasively will probably always be small.
Second, such questions can always be decided by review of lower
federal court decisions.
In the course of his unsuccessful efforts to persuade the Court
to end evasion by the California Supreme Court, the California
attorney general suggested a novel theory to justify curbing
evasion. In the petition for certiorari in Anderson, the attorney
general argued that the evasive judgment below deprived the
people of certain federally protected rights. Submitting that the
republican form of government clause in the Constitution and
the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment guaranteed "the fundamental right of the people to
have their duly elected representatives empowered to enact and
execute laws, for the protection of citizens' life, liberty, and
property," 13 he argued that this right was violated when, "over
the will of a protesting public", the California court usurped the
function of the state legislature and invalidated the death penalty:
What more basic right do the people of a State have, than
to be able to provide through their elected representatives for
the protection of society against dangerous criminals? This
basic power to prescribe appropriate punishment for crime
129 Numerous amicus briefs were filed in Krivda by state attorneys general
asking that the Court reconsider Mapp.
130 One of the questions presented to the Court by petitioner in Ware was
this: should Miranda be overruled?
13 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3, California v. Anderson, 406 U.S. 958(1972.).
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exclusive of punishment involving unnecessary cruelty such
as torture, as defined by this Court's decisions, lies at the heart
of the police power reserved to the people of the States.132
The thrust of the argument appears to be that the Constitution
guarantees the people of a state, through their elected representa-
tives, the right to protect themselves against criminals, and that a
federal question is raised when a state court denies that right
against the popular will.
The novelty of this argument cloaks much of its speciousness.
The fourteenth amendment furnishes rights to individuals, and
insofar as the "public" has rights, those rights are held indi-
vidually and not collectively. The fourteenth amendment does
not guarantee the people of a state the right to have their legis-
lature enact statutes suppressing crime. It is a limitation on the
power of the state, not an enlargement of the rights of the people
as a whole to use law to punish criminals. Moreover, the republic
form of government clause does not authorize the Supreme Court
to intervene in state affairs simply because it is claimed that a
judgment of the state court invades the province of the state
legislature. Properly viewed, a claim by one branch of state gov-
ernment that another branch has usurped its rightful powers is a
political question beyond the ken of the Supreme Court.
The California attorney general has also argued that evasion
must be curbed because it is unfair to allow the defendant to
appeal a conviction under a claim that federal rights have been
violated while not allowing the prosecution to appeal an evasively
framed judgment in favor of the defendant's rights. 33 While this
argument seems reasonable at first blush, it suffers from the same
infirmity as the "republican form of government" argument: the
Constitution does not give the public, nor the prosecution as
the representative of the public, any "rights" in a criminal trial.
Within the confines of certain federal constitutional limitations,
132 Id. at 17-18.
233 If article I section 19 of the California Constitution is adequate non-
federal ground supporting the search and seizure decisions of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, the People of the State of California will be
pe rmanently denied access to this forum on its own petition in a search
and seizure case. Only criminal defendants alleging the denial of mini-
mum due process wil have access if the California Supreme Court's
citation to article I, section 19 is deemed adequate to support its judg-




the powers of the prosecution are completely determined by state
law. Since the prosecution has no federal rights that the Supreme
Court could protect by review, it is not unfair to deny the prosecu-
tion an appeal when a state court limits prosecutorial powers.
While it is submitted that the arguments against evasive tactics
are basically unfounded, it would be myopic to conclude that the
arguments will go unheard. The Burger Court is an activist court.
It asserts its power as aggressively as did the Warren Court; it
simply has different goals in mind."5 4 Quite possibly, therefore,
the Court will discontinue watching supinely while its authority is
avoided by state courts holding in favor of the rights of criminal
suspects. On the other hand, it is not possible to shut off all such
evasion unless a constitutional amendment were adopted author-
izing the Court to review all state judgments, irrespective of
whether they contained a federal question, and to review all
questions of law presented in state judgments. The adoption of
such an amendment is quite improbable, both because it would
place an impossible burden on an overworked Court and because
it would destroy this nation's dual judiciary system.
There are several steps that the Burger Court itself could
take to curb evasive actions by state courts. The Court could
overrule Murdock insofar as it held that repeal of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 did not grant power to review all issues in a case in
which a federal claim was presented. 35 Such an action would
abrogate the adequate state ground rule, thus allowing the Court
to review all issues, both federal and state, in cases involving a
federal question. It is unlikely, however, that the Court will take
this step. It would increase the Court's work, and, by permitting
the Court to rule on issues of state law, it would call for the Court
to decide the type of question it has always refrained from
deciding. Furthermore, it would intrude upon the healthy fed-
eralism necessary to this nation's dual judiciary system.
The Court might redefine rather than eliminate the adequate
1
34 Dershowitz and Ely, Harris v. New York, Some Anxious Observations on
the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALF, LJ. 1198, 1227
(1971).
135 This step could also be accomplished by a congressional enactment amend-
ing § 1257 to specifially provide that the Court may review all questions of law
in an case involving a federal question, even if the judgment is also supported by
an adequate state ground.
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state ground rule. This step seems to be the one the Court will
take if it acts to curb the evasion. The redefinition could take
several different forms. The Court could adopt the position that
the rule is not jurisdictional, thus establishing its power to review
state judgments even though supported by an adequate non-
federal ground. Then in a case involving a federal question, the
Court could exercise its power of review and afrm the judgment
if the federal question had been decided correctly. If the federal
question had been decided erroneously, the Court could correct
the federal question and vacate, but not reverse, the judgment,
leaving the state court free on remand to reinstate its prior judg-
ment, but only on state grounds. While this alternative would
permit the Court to review state judgments supported by adequate
state grounds, it in fact calls for the rendering of advisory opinions,
as suggested in Herb v. Pitcairn. Under 28 U.S. C. § 1257, the
Court has authority to review judgments involving federal ques-
tions; the Court has no authority to review opinions-that is, the
reasons given below for the decision. If the judgment below
cannot be reversed because it is supported by adequate state
grounds, the Court in reviewing such a judgment is reviewing not
the judgment itself, but rather the reasons for the judgment. The
reasoning of Herb v. Pitcairn-that the rule is jurisdictional-would
thus seem to be eminently correct, and the Court would be unwise
to decide otherwise.
Under a different approach, the Court could modify the
adequate state ground rule with a new definition of independence.
The Court could take the position that similar provisions of federal
and state law must be construed similarly. Thus, when a state
court construes a provision of state law as conferring a right
broader than a similar provision of federal law, the Court could
find that the state ground was inadequate to support the judgment
because it was not independent. Thus every state decision in-
terpreting a state constitutional provision or statute that is similar
to provisions of federal law would itself raise a federal question.
This step would be a radical one since hitherto the state courts
have been free to construe provisions of state law as they wished,
subject to the requirement that they not deny a federal right.
Finally, the Court could modify the rule by relaxing it in
cases in which a state court resting its judgment on state grounds
1974]
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was found to be motivated by an "illegitimate" desire to evade
the Court.18  There are serious drawbacks to such an approach.
Judgments as to motivation are difficult and time-consuming.
Furthermore, such an approach would intrude upon the healthy
aspects of federalism, for federalism implies that state courts
may disagree with the Supreme Court as long as they do not
interfere with the federal rights of persons accused of crime.
CONCLUSION
During the Warren era commentators on occasion attacked
the Supreme Court on the ground that the Court was transforming
the Bill of Rights into a nationwide code of criminal procedure,
3 7
with the result that the states were no longer free to experiment
or innovate in the area of criminal justice. After four full terms
of the Burger Court, there is no longer a realistic basis for these
claims. Indeed, just the opposite appears to be occurring. By
lowering the level of constitutional protections the Burger Court
has invited the states to adopt standards higher than those of
federal law. As a result, it is to be expected that the tendency
of state courts to evade the Burger Court by basing rulings in
favor of the rights of the accused on grounds of state law will
increase. Undoubtedly other forms of evasion will occur also.13
186 This suggestion was made and rejected in Bice, Anderson and the Ade-
quate State Ground 45 So. CAL. L. REv. 750, 759-60 (1972).
1'7 E.g., Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL.
L. REv. 929 (1965).
138 For example, several state appellate courts, while recognizing the binding
authority of Kirby, have nevertheless indicated that they expect police authorities
within their respective jurisdictions to provide counsel to suspects placed in
preindictment lineups. See e.g., Baker v. State, 498 P.2d 1311 (Nev. 1972);
Chandler v. State, 501 P.2d 512 (Okla. Cr. App. 1972). Others have
stringently interpreted Kirby. See e.g., Arnold v. State, 484 S.W.2d 248 (Mo.
1972); State v. Tingler, 285 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1972). One state court has re-
fused to recognize the plurality opinion as binding precedent and has instead held
itself bound by Wade. See People v. Anderson 205 N.W.2d 461 (Mich. 1973).
In Johnson v. State, 284 N.E.2d 517 (Ind. 1972), the majority opinion
adopted the holding in Harris. But a dissenting judge wrote: "[I vote to adopt
the rule for Indiana, that statements taken in violation of Miranda requirements
are inadmissible for impeachment purposes. The State is correct in pointing out
to this Court in its brief that we are free to establish stricter constitutional require-
ments in the reception of evidence than those adopted by the United States Supreme
Court. I would do just that in this case." Id. at 521 (dissenting opinion of
DeBruker, J.). See also People v. Hayes, 96 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1st D.C.A. 1971);
State v. Boyd, 294 A.2d 459 (Me. 1972).
There appears to be an increasing tendency for state courts in civil cases to
resolve novel constitutional issues on both state and federal grounds. See, e.g.,
Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215 (Alaska 1973); Brown v. Merlo, 506 P.2d 212, 106
Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973); Randone v. Superior Court, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709
(Continued on next page)
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Whether the Court will move to curb evasion is speculative; the
Burger Court, like its predecessors, is unpredictable. Perhaps
some checks on evasion will be made, but it should not be for-
gotten that evasion by use of the adequate state ground rule is
perfectly legitimate. It does not involve unlawful defiance of the
Court's lawful authority.
justice Harlan often voiced his belief that criminal justice in
this nation should be decentralized, that state criminal procedure
should be unhampered by federal constitutional restraints as long
as fundamental standards of fairness were adhered to.18 9 Chief
justice Burger has expressed the same attitude. 40 The new
federalism in criminal procedure arising from the Burger Court's
attitude toward criminal suspects suggests that the 1970's may
well be the decade in which Justice Harlan's views are in the
ascendant.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(1971); Jolicoer v. Mihaly, 488 P.2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1971); Serrano v. Priest,
487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Blair v. Pitchess, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1971); Blocker v. Blackburn, 185 S.E.2d 56 (Ga. 1971); Corley v.
Lewless, 182 S.E.2d 766 (Ga. 1971); Haas v. South Bend School Corp., 289
N.E.2d 499 (Ind. 1972); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972); State
ex te. Payne v. Walden, 190 S.E.2d 770 (W.Va. 1972).
In Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Indiana War Memorials Comm'n,
291 N.E.2d 888 (Ind.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. - (1973), a civil liberties orga-
nization appealed from a judgment which upheld the action of a state commission in
denying the organization the use of a public auditorium. The Indiana Supreme
Court totally ignored the federal questions raised by the parties and held that the
action of the state commission violated the equal protection clause of the Indiana
Constitution. 291 N.E.2d at 890. Claiming that the Indiana court had "attempted to
preclude review of its decision in te case giving rise to this Petition by failing to
rule upon the Federal constitutional questions presented on appeal," the state attor-
ney general filed a petition for writ of certiorari under 28 US.C. § 1257. Petitioner's
Brief for Certiorari at 7. The petiton presented the Supreme Court with the
question whether the Indiana court would be permitted to preclude review of its
decisions by failing to consider the federal question and instead deciding the
question on substantially similar state constitutional grounds. Id. at 2-3. The
petition was denied. Indiana War Memorials Comm n v. Indiana Civil Liberties
Union, Inc., 414 U.S. - (1973).
Of course there are some state courts which attempt to avoid Burger Court
decisions that vindicate federal rights. E.g., State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761
(Del. 1973); State v. Waddell, 194 S.E.2d 19 (N.C. 1973).
139 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (concurring opinion of Harlan,
J.); Malloyv. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.);
Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
140 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (concurring opinion of Burger,
C.J.).
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